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REPRESENTING INTERDISCIPLINARITY
KUNAL M. PARKER*

M

Y first meeting with Penny Pether involved a moment of mutual recognition as outsiders of a sort to conventional U.S. legal scholarship.
I was presenting a paper at the law school at American University, where
Penny was a member of the faculty. In the question period that followed
my talk, I used the word “overdetermined” in response to a faculty question. Penny came up to me after the talk and said in (what I took to be)
an approving way, “This is the first time I’ve heard the word ‘overdetermined’ used at a law faculty talk.” For me, there was an instant flash of
intellectual kinship. In what is surely testimony to my own failure of good
historian’s record-keeping and archival practice, I went back to my curriculum vitae to see if I could pinpoint the precise date of our first meeting. I
could not, but it was somewhere around the fall of 2000. In the decade
that followed, Penny invited me to a few conferences, and I put her in
touch with friends I knew who were working on issues related to those that
interested her. One of the last things she wrote, and which has now come
out in print, was a review of my book on the common law.1
David Caudill’s kind invitation to me to participate in this conference
commemorating Penny’s scholarship afforded me the opportunity to read
through a large portion—although by no means all—of the vast corpus of
scholarship that Penny left behind. In our initial discussions about the
nature of my contribution to this conference, I told David that I would
look at one corner of Penny’s scholarship, that involving law-and-literature. David warned me that this would not necessarily be easy: “law-andliterature” was an approach for Penny, something that pervaded everything she wrote. It would therefore be difficult to restrict an exploration
of Penny’s law-and-literature scholarship to work that employed texts conventionally recognized to be “literary” (although there was no shortage of
those). David was correct. So I read and read and am grateful for the
opportunity. I learned something of the tremendous range of Penny’s intellectual preoccupations, as well as of the erudition, honesty, forthrightness, and courage of her writing. In one sense, reading her work over the
weeks leading up to the conference was an acquaintance with a Penny that
I suspected existed but never knew as well as I now do.
* Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami
School of Law.
1. See generally Penelope Pether, Review Essay: American Common Law: Politics,
History, and Democracy, 26 LAW & LITERATURE 249 (2014) (reviewing KUNAL M.
PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL
THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011)).

(561)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016

1

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-3\VLR304.txt

562

unknown

Seq: 2

5-OCT-15

9:32

VILLANOVA
AW60,RIss.
EVIEW
Villanova
Law Review,LVol.
3 [2016], Art. 4[Vol. 60: p. 561

Based on this reading, I want to offer some reflections about interdisciplinarity, as practiced by Penny Pether and by those such as myself who
describe themselves as legal historians. These reflections are in part about
my own trajectory. Since the time I first met Penny, I pursued a doctorate
in history. No doubt as a result of the disciplinary training I acquired as a
historian, I ceased to use words such as “overdetermined.”
To begin with, it is perhaps important to confront what it means to
say that law is a “discipline,” in relationship to which it is possible to do
“interdisciplinary” scholarship. In 2001, Penny published a brave—but
also uproariously funny—article, entitled Discipline and Punish, which was a
send-up of scholarship and publishing in the U.S. legal academy.2 It was
her way of coming to terms with law as a “discipline” in the United States.
To a former law review editor such as myself, the article could not have
been more on point. Penny described in hilarious detail the utterly ludicrous norms regarding citation that law students imbibe, master, and
reproduce, including such inane things as an appropriate ratio between
“text” and “footnotes” (texts with more footnotes are desirable). She
wrote about the ponderous citation reference manuals and citation manual wars that dominated the law review world. In American legal scholarship, Penny argued, footnotes were no longer a mere means of
acknowledging the work of others or pointing towards further reading.
Instead, ballooning in importance, they had become an end in themselves,
an object through which authors and student editors could demonstrate
mastery of a perverse—and perversely valued—skill. But there was more.
Footnotes had become “a tidy way of consigning contingency to the textual margins, and the fact that their skilful and varied use is advocated to
student authors and candidates for law review membership rewards the
capacity to marginalise complexity and likewise reifies rigid
doctrinalism.”3
Based on her discussion of footnoting culture, Penny’s overall diagnosis of the state of U.S. legal scholarship as a “discipline” was devastating.
Academic U.S. legal culture was one “in which citation is extraordinarily
powerful.”4 It betrayed an obsession with authority and a corresponding
impoverishment of intellectual seriousness. Penny put it thus:
Massive citation [ ] and a comparative scarcity of the ‘original’
critical or imaginative or interdisciplinary or theoretical work of
scholarship that one might anticipate finding in recent Australian legal periodicals, is a feature both of the work of those running law reviews and those whose work they accredit—who are
often, of course, former law review editors themselves.5
2. Penelope Pether, Discipline and Punish: Despatches from the Citation Manual
Wars and Other (Literally) Unspeakable Stories, 10 GRIFFITH L. REV. 101, 119 (2001).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 120 (footnote omitted).
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This academic culture had pernicious effects not only on legal scholarship, but also on lived racial, class, and gender hierarchies on law faculties,
in law classrooms, and, no doubt, in the world at large.
Penny argued that this ponderous, intellectually impoverished, profoundly hierarchical system had a precise birth date. An outgrowth of
law’s pretension to be a “science,” it could be traced back to the celebrated pedagogical and scholarly style that had been developed by
Harvard Law School’s Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell in the 1870s
and that had spread across American legal education thereafter. According to Penny, “Langdell’s legal science”—which she saw as dominant in
both contemporary U.S. legal scholarship and pedagogy—stood for “a
hostility to theory, or scholarship of the kind that does something other
than labor doctrinal points to death with the accompaniment of an hysterical profusion of citations to authority.”6 Insofar as “Langdell’s legal science” sought to become “a system of rules and identify[ ] a body of
doctrine that language describes rather than constitutes,” it consistently
suppressed law’s rhetoricity and history.7
Penny could not have been clearer about this. She once put it
thus: “Langdell’s legal science forgets the common history of law and rhetoric . . . .”8 Elsewhere, she said: “[L]egal science denies history.”9 Not
surprisingly, insofar as it suppressed law’s rhetoricity and history, “Langdell’s legal science” was “gendered and classed and raced, depending for
its authority on removing contestation, the voices of others, from the text
and hermeneutics of the law.”10 Most law professors were male and thoroughly schooled in Langdellian science; they had no experience with rhetoric or history and therefore reinforced the Langdellian idea that law is
doctrine.11
For Penny, in other words, law as a “discipline” was something of an
enemy, a curious way to do interdisciplinary scholarship. However, once
one had identified the enemy, one knew how to defeat it. In diagnosing
the problem, Penny prescribed the solution. If “Langdell’s legal science”
reigned supreme in the law reviews and legal scholarship, Penny’s interdisciplinarity could—and should—deflate law’s pretensions to be a self-sufficient scientific “system” that described an existing world.
Interdisciplinarity would return law to its history and its rhetoricity. But
what did it mean to return law to its history and its rhetoricity (which, I
would argue, were often one and the same for Penny)? Why would one do
so? To what end?
6. Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility
of Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 502 (2002) [hereinafter Pether, Measured
Judgments].
7. Id. at 500.
8. Id. at 502.
9. Id. at 500.
10. Id. at 517.
11. Id. at 502.
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The aim was quite explicitly to open law up to destabilization, contestation, reinterpretation, and remaking. From a perspective that Penny repeatedly identified as “feminist poststructuralist,”12 she represented the
function of what she called the “law and literature methodology” as that of
“reading literary texts against legal texts in order both to make certain
kinds of discourses—cultural stories—that they have in common and re/
produce visible, and to use law and literature’s interdisciplinarity as a way
to destabilize the discipline of law in the interests of making change.”13
Elsewhere, she wrote of “ ‘an alliance [between law and literature] that
aims at generating political friction, intentionally going against the grain’
and ‘an effective agitation of the organs of power’ . . . .”14
Penny’s espousal of the feminist poststructuralist perspective, and her
corresponding interest in destabilizing law, made her quite certain what
law-and-literature should not be. She did not want a law-and-literature “interdiscipline” that taught students “to be intellectual democrats, or . . .
[to] acquire empathy, or . . . [to] cultivate the sensibility of the civil and
the civilized . . . .”15 Assumptions such as these, she insisted, growing as
they did out of a humanistic faith in literature’s potential, should be
deeply troubling to any scholar who knew something of the “histories of
the moralizing missions of English studies.”16 Indeed, flinching whenever
she “witness[ed] law’s grasping for the literary or . . . literature’s ideologically sanitised synecdoche, narrative, as nurse, priest, or therapist,” Penny
said she was always reminded of one of her Australian literature professors
who said that “many of the most venal people he knew were literary critics.”17 The work of the right kind of law-and-humanities scholarship necessarily entailed pedagogical violence; it did not come out of a placid and
reassuring place called “literature.”18
This sense of what law-and-literature should and should not be was
the basis of Penny’s critique of the work of James Boyd White, whose “liberal humanist commitments,” as she put it, sought to reinforce a sense of
community and commonality in ways that Penny was suspicious of.19
12. See Penny Pether, Acts of Hope, James Boyd White, Acts of Hope: Creating
Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics, 3 LAW TEXT CULTURE 276, 276 (1997)
(book review).
13. Pether, Measured Judgments, supra note 6, at 491.
14. Penelope Pether, Jangling the Keys to the Kingdom: Some Reflections on The
Crucible, on an American Constitutional Paradox, and on Australian Judicial Review, 8
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 317, 318 (1996) (quoting Judith Koffler, Forged
Alliance: Law and Literature, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1374, 1375 (1989) (book review)).
15. Penelope Pether, (Re)centering, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 131,
132 (1998) [hereinafter Pether, (Re)centering].
16. Id.
17. Penelope Pether, On ‘Cruelty’: Law, Literature, and Difference, in DELEUZE
AND LAW 69, 76 (Laurent de Sutter & Kyle McGee eds., 2012) [hereinafter Pether,
Cruelty].
18. Id. at 75.
19. Penelope Pether, Language, in LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: AN INTRODUCTION 315, 319 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Pether, Language].
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Penny insistently distanced herself from White’s assumptions about his
imagined audience of autonomous individual subjects and from “what is
presented as a purely ethical project of self-shaping through a certain type
of intellectual commitment, cerebral rather than embodied . . . .”20 For
her, Austin Sarat and Robin West offered “[s]ignificant ‘supplementary’
models of humanist law and language scholarship,” but the use of the
dreaded adjective “humanist” reveals where she was coming from in regard to the work of these scholars as well.21 Equally trenchant was her
critique of Ian Ward for arguing that law-and-literature scholarship seeks
the “inculcation of empathy; the engendering of the ability to recognise
and hear those ‘others’ the law renders mute; the drawing of the cloistered legal subject into engagement with the world; providing an heuristic
for discerning moral touchstones serviceable in that world . . . .”22 All of
this, Penny concluded, only “enabl[ed] a kind of narcissistic therapeutics
of identity . . . .”23
As one might imagine, Penny’s understanding of how and from where
law should be destabilized extended not just to law-and-literature, but to
all interdisciplinary endeavors. It was not only literature, in other words,
that should become the object of endless and vigilant scrutiny, even as it
provided a ground from which to destabilize law. Any discipline that purported to destabilize law in the name of interdisciplinary scholarship
should also destabilize itself. This view allowed Penny to criticize many
dominant forms of interdisciplinary scholarship. Here is what Penny said
about Realist legal thought and law-and-society scholarship generally:
Offering accounts of the “truth” of “law” or legality or legal
processes or the operation of legal institutions drawn from other
disciplines, and implicitly predicated on understanding those disciplines as truth procedures, [interdisciplinary work] differs fundamentally from work in the critical theoretical tradition [i.e.,
her own], which provides supplementary rather than totalizing
accounts of law, often passing judgment on law, while refusing to
foreclose the “possibility of justice.”24
Thus, interdisciplinary work could not be “truth procedure” of any kind
and Penny was correct that it often functions this way.
I have a great deal of sympathy for Penny’s perspectives on interdisciplinarity and, indeed, have proceeded from similar ground in my own
attempts to make sense of the history of U.S. legal and historical thought.
But I also have some questions to raise and, if Penny were here, I would
have loved to know how she would have responded to them. Some of
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 322.
Pether, Cruelty, supra note 17, at 73.
Id.
Pether, Language, supra note 19, at 329.
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these come from my own preoccupations with historical knowledge,
others from reflections on interdisciplinarity that emerge from my reading
of Penny’s work.
First, as the philosopher Karl Löwith reminded us decades ago in his
book, Meaning in History, religious knowledge is as capable of destabilizing
the orders of this world as skeptical knowledge is.25 In other words, although the difference between disciplines invested in a notion of truth
and those suspicious of it, or the difference between humanist understandings of literature and non-humanist ones, mattered a great deal to
Penny, if the object of interdisciplinary work is to destabilize law, the
ground from which one destabilizes—especially in a specific context—
might not always matter a great deal. Religious fundamentalists, orthodox
Marxists, and critical-theoretical thinkers might all do an equally effective
job of destabilizing law and, indeed, might agree on the results, even if not
on the basis from which they proceed. The Christian tradition has been as
adept at calling for redistribution of wealth as an avowedly secular Leftist
one. Furthermore, both traditions have long been open to different interpretations and do not point in any unitary direction.
Similarly, humanist empathy of the kind Penny deplored might work
in ways entirely congruent with the non-humanist approaches she preferred. If we look at the long history of attempts to destabilize law from its
“outside,” we see that powerful forms of historical contextualization—for
example, the feudalism-to-commerce narrative associated with the Scottish
Enlightenment—were as skilled at arguing for and bringing about change
as the more self-consciously anti-foundational modernist and post-modern
ones of our own time. Judging from the perspective of effects and consequences, if not of intellectual commitments and aesthetics, I might at least
wonder how we might read our own self-consciously post-structuralist interdisciplinary endeavors against those of periods past. How might we situate our interdisciplinary efforts in relationship to those of earlier times
once we know that, in many ways, they were as effective as our own? How
might this undermine our complacency regarding our own fetish for
destabilizing?
Second, I wonder how, if we are all equally committed to destabilizing
law, different disciplinary commitments from and through which we proceed might nevertheless continue to have different effects. What Penny
often did in her work was “essay” what she called “an intertextual exploration” that would involve juxtaposing texts from one genre (literature)
against those from another (law). Thus, in her article, Regarding the Miller
Girls, Penny offered a reading of Henry James’s novella, Daisy Miller, alongside an exploration of the early twenty-first-century trials of the journalist
Judith Miller of The New York Times. As Penny put it:
25. See generally KARL LÖWITH, MEANING IN HISTORY: THE THEOLOGICAL IMPLIPHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (1949).

CATIONS OF THE
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Daisy’s story is represented and interpreted in a novella,
later the basis of a film, made in 1974. Judy’s played itself out on
the pages of the nation’s press and other media organs, from
NPR to the blogosphere, and in an opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.26
There was a point, of course, to this interdisciplinary strategy. It was supposed to jar. As Penny put it, this “diachronic strategy sets itself against
[legal] doctrine’s synchronic, ahistorical, acontextual hermeneutic
practices.”27
But such an interdisciplinary strategy would also be jarring to many
historians who might share Penny’s destabilizing inclinations. Penny undoubtedly knew this. In arguing that her “diachronic strategy”—juxtaposing Henry James’s heroine with a contemporary journalist—distinguished
her approach from that of New Historicists, she was also aware that her
approach was different from the approaches of professional historians,
who are committed to situating objects in historical context, which often
means cabining them into their “own” time. In their elaboration of “periods,” historians typically use “synchronic” strategies to contextualize objects, although these strategies ultimately underscore change over time
(thus implying “diachronicity”) and are therefore as capable of destabilizing objects as the more stark “diachronic” strategies of law-and-literature
that Penny self-consciously employed.
If historians might not care for the particular “diachronic” strategies
Penny employed, many of them might also be inattentive to language in
ways that Penny was, which underscores Penny’s own particular disciplinary training in literature. Penny could write (as she did in a book review): “The clogged prose and wordiness are features of this book, as is the
lack of care evident in flaws in punctuation: the frequency of these latter,
and of spelling errors, reflects on both author and publisher.”28 She was
attentive to writing in a way that many historians, at least now that history
has shed many of its belle-lettristic trappings, might not be.
Yet another difference, and an important one, between the approach
of the historian and the approach of the literary scholar (which might
speak to the difference between a focus on history and one on rhetoricity)
might have to do with the implications of interdisciplinary scholarship in a
legal context. “ ‘[U]sing the literary genre of law to reinstate the uncer26. Penelope Pether, Regarding the Miller Girls: Daisy, Judith, and the Seeming
Paradox of In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 19 LAW & LITERATURE 187, 194
(2007) [hereinafter Pether, Regarding the Miller Girls] (footnotes omitted).
27. Pether, Measured Judgments, supra note 6, at 492.
28. Penelope Pether, Review Essay, 13 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 323,
323 (2001) (reviewing DIETER PAUL POLLOCZEK, LITERATURE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE:
EQUITY AND ETHICS FROM STERNE TO CONRAD (Cambridge University Press, 1999) &
LYNNE MARIE DE CICCO, WOMEN AND LAWYERS IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY
ENGLISH NOVEL: UNEASY ALLIANCES AND NARRATIVE MISREPRESENTATION (Lewiston,
Queenston and Lampeter: Edwin Mellen, 1996).
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tainty and the undecidability of the writing of law’ ”29 was explicitly tied by
Penny to legal pedagogy, to her faith and insistence that teaching students
to interpret would make them better lawyers. Historians are content to
demonstrate the changeability, uncertainty, and undecidability of law, but
they do not always have a concrete proposal for legal pedagogy. Penny
tied her work in literature to her intense engagement with the structures
and hierarchies of legal practice and pedagogy. Her interdisciplinary preoccupations were always worked out in a practical and lived way.
I suggest these differences between the interdisciplinary approaches
of literary scholars and historians to get us to think hard about to how our
different disciplines exercise a hold over us, even as we all might share the
project of destabilizing law. Destabilization looks different depending
upon the place from which it is done. What might that mean?
Third, I wonder how, whether, and when interdisciplinary work exhausts itself. The effort to destabilize law has been going on for centuries.
It is at least as old as the effort to stabilize law. But the specific interdisciplinary moment which Penny and I shared, albeit coming at it from different disciplines, has itself been a rather sustained one. Where is the
“charge” or “rush” now in restoring to law its historicity and rhetoricity?
Where is the excitement of railing—in iconoclastic fashion—at “Langdell’s legal science”? To be sure, Penny’s rage at the injustices of the
world, and her courage in identifying and denouncing these injustices,
might obviate such questions. Why might one care about intellectual novelty in the face of a world of persistent injustices? But in a meditation on
interdisciplinarity, such questions might be apposite.
In my view, the issue is not as much about looking for the next new
thing, the newest vital “charge,” as it is about recognizing that the “law”
that we seek to destabilize as interdisciplinary scholars has long been imbibing critiques, and presenting itself differently, both in the world of
practice and in the world of pedagogy. Indeed, “Langdell’s legal science”—which for Penny was the enemy—was not ahistorical in its own day.
Instead, it was quite historical and intended explicitly to reveal the evolution of legal doctrine on the lines of the dominant Darwinian-Spencerian
historical temporalities of the day. This is quite clear from the structure of
Langdell’s famous casebooks, which included “correctly” and “incorrectly”
decided cases in order for the student to see the unfolding of legal doctrine over time.30 If “Langdell’s legal science,” the thing we have grown to
love to hate, was not what we have made it out to be even at its moment of
origin, it is certainly not today. Today’s law professors, and the casebooks
and materials they use, routinely employ work produced in other disciplinary contexts to “round out” or “provide context” to the doctrines they
29. Pether, Language, supra note 19, at 331 (quoting PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN
COURTS OF LOVE 8 (1996)).
30. I discuss this in KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1790–2000: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 253–54 (2011).

THE

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss3/4

8

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-3\VLR304.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 9

INTERDISCIPLINARITY
Parker:
Representing Interdisciplinarity

5-OCT-15

9:32

569

teach. The results are often disappointingly shallow: other disciplines are
there to provide a gloss, a whiff of erudition, or a brief preface before
students can get on to the “real work” of studying doctrine. Law students,
in turn, see things this way. They stop taking notes when history or literature is discussed, but return to their keyboards once the discussion returns
to cases and statutes. But my point is that our object of contextualization—law—is thoroughly aware of our critiques. For a while now, it has
become resilient, inoculated itself against the disease of interdisciplinarity,
and developed hardy antibodies. This might be the problem of interdisciplinarity today, the problem it needs to confront.
At this point, then, where do we turn? If the power of critique might
have dimmed as a result of its domestication, where do we look? Within
certain strands of history and anthropology, including my own work, the
effort has been to shift gears, to learn from the object of contextualization
itself. Instead of turning our critical lamp on our objects, letting our objects turn their lamps on us. This is a provisional approach, not the end of
the line.
Penny’s approach in law-and-literature was generally to use literature
against law, and not to use law against literature. As she put it in a footnote in her essay entitled Language: “It might—aptly—be said that ‘Law’ is
the privileged element in this dyad: that my focus is on what language
scholarship can tell us about law, rather than what legal scholarship can
tell us about language. I would concede the point . . . .”31 Following from
what I just said, my own approach to interdisciplinarity, in contradistinction to Penny’s, was to turn to the common law, and specifically to its
notions of temporality, to reflect upon the limits of historical time and
contextualization. In other words, I sought to bring law to bear on history,
even as I brought history to bear on law.32
But Penny’s extraordinary vigilance and courage as a thinker meant
this approach was implicit in her writing as well. She would never be content merely with bringing literature to bear on law. Always able to turn on
herself, she was acutely attentive to what she called the “great uncertainty”
that beset “scholarly and pedagogical practices of law and literature . . . .”33 She worried incessantly about “whether in exploring what our
bodies can do . . . we may engage with other bodies to reproduce the
molar ‘overcoding’ of the seductively familiar logic of ‘us and
them’ . . . .”34
In the late 1990s, in testimony to her ability to turn on her own preferred interdisciplinary approach, Penny recounted something she had
learned from working with students at the Benjamin N. Cardozo Law
School. She wrote of a student in her class who read stories about Austra31.
32.
33.
34.

Pether, Language, supra note 19, at 318 n.7.
See generally PARKER, supra note 30.
Pether, Cruelty, supra note 17, at 86.
Id. (citation omitted).
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lian indigenous peoples forcibly removed from their families by Australian
law. These foreign narratives that furthered a change in perspective began when the student had read U.S. slave narratives as an undergraduate.
The student now believed that affirmative action was right. Penny wrote:
“Once [the student] had made that judgment abroad, he brought it
home; his view was that the defensiveness engendered by his position in
American culture would not have been moved without this comparative
law perspective.”35 The destabilization—the goal of interdisciplinarity for
Penny—had happened. Penny could well have been offering the ideal
case of how literature should destabilize law. But it was not to be. Penny
continued: “But that student still believed that affirmative action was unconstitutional, a conviction that profoundly challenged me: a teacher and
scholar of constitutional law in my country of origin.”36 The law-and-literature method could fail. In the case of this student, perhaps it had.
As part of Penny’s recognition of the possibilities of failure, I would
argue that Penny not only brought literature to law, but also law to literature. She might not necessarily have seen it as such.
As stated above, Penny fervently believed that the power of the critical
law-and-literature technique came in revivifying a sense of law’s interpretivity. Hope for a better world lay in restoring a sense that law was endlessly susceptible to interpretation and remaking. She put it thus:
I believe that with [ ] interpretivity . . . comes the possibility of
ethics in Levinas’s sense. . . . It will take our theorizing and practicing and theorizing again a pedagogy of what I might call law
and literature, or interpretivity, or, borrowing from Peter Goodrich, of rhetoric as well as one of hermeneutics.37
In recent years, however, Penny saw everywhere a tendency in the legal world to turn away from interpretivity. In her work on the increasingly
prevalent practice of not publishing federal court opinions,38 Penny argued that federal judges were doing all they could “to foreclose [the] interpretation of the texts they produce . . . .”39 This was also a deplorable
tendency among law students: “I am despairing about my students’ yearning for rules and for abstractions, about their unwillingness and thus inability to interpret.”40 In shunning interpretation, students seemed both
35. Pether, (Re)centering, supra note 15, at 133.
36. Id.
37. Penelope Pether, Is There Anything Outside the Class? Law, Literature, and
Pedagogy, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2415, 2421 (2005) [hereinafter Pether, Is There Anything Outside the Class?].
38. For her posthumously published work on this matter, see Penelope
Pether, Strange Fruit: What Happened to the U.S. Doctrine of Precedent?, 60 VILL. L. REV.
443 (2015).
39. Pether, Is There Anything Outside the Class, supra note 37, at 2422.
40. Id.
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to be making themselves worse lawyers and to be shying away from doing
justice.
So it was supremely interesting to me that, in her work on the spreading practice of not publishing federal court opinions, Penny should have
turned not only to literature, but also to the common law. It was the old
common law, Penny argued, that best embodied the interpretivity that lawand-literature scholarship sought to achieve in and for law. The object of
the critique (law) thus revealed itself to contain, prior to critique, what the
critique was intended to achieve. Penny argued that the federal judiciary
was betraying the ethics embodied in common law practice:
Through the systems of institutionalized unpublication, depublication, and stipulated withdrawal of judicial opinions, the fetishizing of the per curiam in its various historical iterations, and
the egregious practice of issuing large numbers of one-word judicial opinions without reasons, U.S. judges have learned to foreclose the engagement that produces the common law at its
interpretable best . . . .41
This is related to what, in her essay juxtaposing Daisy Miller and Judith
Miller, Penny deplored as a creeping “Continentalization” of law. In
James’s novella, the Continentalization/Europeanization of the character
Winterbourne resulted in his inability to read Daisy Miller herself. In the
judicial realm, it meant a certain textual fundamentalism, a civilian—and
decidedly non-common lawyerly—fetishization of text that closed off interpretation. At the end of the essay, Penny assails those, including law-andliterature scholars, for “believing that there is nothing principled in law,
that it is merely a rhetorical cover for politics.”42 She condemned the federal judiciary for “exorcising . . . law’s spirit: common law constitutionalism.”43 The common law’s emphasis on interpretation needed to be
revivified; in that emphasis, which could never be “mere” rhetoric, lay its
“principle.”
In other words, after critique, or rather before it, the object of critique revealed itself to have already contained all that critique sought to
accomplish. Law could do for itself what law-and-literature sought to have
it do. Upon the exhaustion or domestication of interdisciplinary work lay
the ahistorical discipline of law itself. I would have loved to hear Penny’s
response to this reading of her work.

41. Id.
42. Pether, Regarding the Miller Girls, supra note 26, at 200.
43. Id. at 201 (footnote omitted).
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